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Abstract: Given that a MAC address can uniquely identify a person or a vehicle, continuous tracking over a large
geographical scale has raised serious privacy concerns amongst governments and the general public. Prior
work has demonstrated that simple hash-based approaches to anonymization can be easily inverted due to the
small search space of MAC addresses. In particular, it is possible to represent the entire allocated MAC address
space in 39 bits and that frequency-based attacks allow for 50% of MAC addresses to be enumerated in 31
bits. We present a practical approach to MAC address anonymization using both computationally expensive
hash functions and truncating the resulting hashes to allow for k-anonymity. We provide an expression for
computing the percentage of expected collisions, demonstrating that for digests of 24 bits it is possible to store
up to 168,617 MAC addresses with the rate of collisions less than 1%. We experimentally demonstrate that
a rate of collision of 1% or less can be achieved by storing data sets of 100 MAC addresses in 13 bits, 1,000
MAC addresses in 17 bits and 10,000 MAC addresses in 20 bits.
1 Introduction
The ubiquitous use of Wi-Fi and Bluetooth among
drivers, passengers and pedestrians has enabled moni-
toring transportation flows on a massive scale through
deployments of wireless scanners along the roads that
passively scan, track and analyze nearby wireless
devices. In particular, wireless scanner equipment
has been deployed for monitoring pedestrian and cy-
clist journey time (Abedi et al., 2015), monitoring
road conditions in real-time (Abberley et al., 2017)
and passenger movements throughout train stations
(Fearn, 2019). Given the fact that a MAC address can
uniquely identify a person or a vehicle, continuous
tracking over a large geographical scale has raised se-
rious privacy concerns amongst governments and the
general public (Minch, 2015; Fearn, 2019).
The current practice adopted by many operators
and dataset providers is to anonymize MAC addresses
using hashing algorithms such as SHA256. However
(Marx et al., 2018) notes that due to a small pre-image
space for MAC addresses, all SHA256 hashed MAC
addresses could be recovered in 13 minutes 22 sec-
onds. Despite MAC addresses containing a 48-bit
search space, with only 0.1% of OUI manufacturer
a https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0180-070X
b https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4747-0870
prefixes for MAC addresses being allocated (Fux-
jaeger et al., 2016) it is possible to represent all MAC
addresses in a digest of 39 bits. Furthermore, due
to the unequal usage of various OUI prefixes (Demir
et al., 2014), it is possible to represent 50% coverage
in 31 bits, 90% coverage in 33 bits and 99% cover-
age in 34 bits respectively. Hence, (Fuxjaeger et al.,
2016) proposes simply removing the OUI manufac-
turer prefix from MAC address before storage. How-
ever, (Martin et al., 2016) finds that contiguous ad-
dress blocks are allocated to specific devices mean-
ing the residual NIC suffix of the MAC address can
similarly be used for identification attacks. (Demir
et al., 2017) contend that it is difficult to control the
anonymity set size when using approximations of the
Birthday Paradox. As shown in our analysis, through
reformulating a Birthday Paradox in (Demir et al.,
2017), we find that the probability of there being at
least one collision exceeds 0.5 when the number of
MAC addresses in the dataset exceeds 4,822 and the
hash is stored in a digest of 24 bits or less.
The evaluation of MAC schemes has been mostly
limited to analysing the ”at least one collision” se-
mantics, representing an all-or-nothing approach. In
this paper we argue that this metric alone is not suffi-
cient for a decision maker to choose an anonymizing
solution as there is a large class of applications, such
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as popular route analysis or building a driver’s profile,
where a small fraction of hash collisions is acceptable
as long as does not affect large-scale patterns. In these
situations, a decision maker is often concerned about
minimising the rate of collisions having accepted the
fact that the collisions are inevitable. In other words,
for these applications, a more practical question is
to select an anonymizing solution that provides an
upper bound on the fraction of MAC addresses that
have collisions rather than minimise the probability
of them happening at all.
In this paper we propose a practical approach to
anonymization which seeks to explore the trade-off
between the fraction of collisions and the hashing
mechanism. We first develop an expression for cal-
culating the overall rate of collisions given the num-
ber of MAC addresses and a digest size, instead of
merely calculating the approximate probability of be-
ing at least one collision. We demonstrate that with a
database of up to 168,617 unique MAC addresses and
a digest size of up to 24 bits, the proportion of MAC
addresses that have collisions remains below 1%. The
proposed approach builds upon recent work on k-
anonymity concept (Li et al., 2019; Thomas et al.,
2019), whereby hashes are truncated such that queries
can be made to k-anonymous buckets for reducing in-
formation leak when searching for data. We experi-
mentally verify this approach by randomly selecting
MAC Addresses from a search space of 8.4 million
MAC addresses generated by a RedHat script for vir-
tual machines.
By considering an acceptable probability of ad-
dress collisions (instead of the acceptable probabil-
ity of one collision), we provide an improved model
for calculating how many bits a hash digest should be
truncated for anonymization. We demonstrate such
calculations are appropriate using empirical experi-
mentation. Furthermore, through utilising computa-
tionally expensive key derivation functions (Thomas
et al., 2019) instead of simple hash algorithms, we are
able to prevent background knowledge attacks doc-
umented in (Demir et al., 2014) and (Martin et al.,
2016) whilst requiring greater effort to identify the
candidate of pre-image MAC addresses. For a proba-
bility of collision less than 1%, we find truncating the
hash digest to 17 bits is suitable for 1,000 MAC ad-
dresses and truncation to 20 bits is suitable for 10,000
MAC addresses. For up to 168,617 MAC addresses,
our approach provides for the number of bits in the di-
gest to be less than or equal to the number of bits ex-
posed in the (Fuxjaeger et al., 2016) approach. Unlike
(Demir et al., 2014), our approach has no dependency
on withholding a secret key and no post-collection ag-
gregation to produce a single identifier.
2 Related Work
Traditionally, the vehicles have been tracked using
Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) sys-
tems, which require expensive camera infrastructure
and computationally intensive image recognition sys-
tems (Blogg et al., 2010). The traffic volume can also
be measured by inductive loops or magnetic sensors
built-into the road (Velisavljevic et al., 2016), how-
ever the technology is limited to counting and clas-
sifying vehicles and lacks vehicular identification ca-
pability. The ubiquitous adoption of Bluetooth and
Wi-Fi devices among drivers, pedestrians and vehi-
cles themselves have enabled low cost tracking and
monitoring pedestrian and motor traffic on a mas-
sive scale. The data has been used for pedestrian
and cyclist journey time (Abedi et al., 2015), mod-
elling road congestion alongside tracking real-time
road traffic conditions (Abberley et al., 2017) and pro-
viding journey time and usage data for public trans-
port (Hidayata et al., 2018). Real world deployments
of such technology include roads in the Highways
England network, whereby digital signage indicates
journey time based on capturing Bluetooth data from
point-to-point. One engineering firm, Clearview In-
telligence, claims Bluetooth-based vehicular tracking
systems are approximately 10% of the cost of equiv-
alent ANPR solutions (Clearview Intelligence Ltd,
2020). Research for Transport Scotland found Blue-
tooth based sensing was very cost effective due to
avoiding digging costs associated with induction loop
counters (Cragg, 2013). The costs of Bluetooth data
collection are significantly cheaper than other data
collection methods (Blogg et al., 2010), as such these
systems are likely to remain as an effective way of
measuring transportation flows.
At the same time, massive deployments of such
technology have raised privacy concerns; (Minch,
2015) notes of a deployment in 2012 where a com-
pany called Renew trialled installation of 12 recycling
bins in the City of London with the capability of cap-
turing wireless MAC address information; on a single
day on the 6th July, 946,016 presences were detected,
which included 106,629 unique MAC addresses. The
company even proposed installing such sensors in re-
strooms, to allow the gender of the user to be inferred.
By August 2013, the City of London Corporation had
requested the trial be halted although the company
claimed they only captured ”extremely limited, en-
crypted, aggregated, and anonymized data.”
Similar privacy concerns have appeared more re-
cently, concerns were raised in May 2019 where
Transport for London (TfL) announced they would
collect MAC address data to understand how passen-
gers move throughout stations (Fearn, 2019). Whilst
TfL claimed the MAC addresses were hashed (with a
salt), privacy advocates argued the approach was not
suitable as there was still a need to link the same MAC
address across observations.
Although hash-based anonymization schemes
have been proposed before, its pitfalls are well docu-
mented in (Demir et al., 2014). It is shown that due to
a small address space, it is possible to reverse hashing
of a MAC address with simple brute force attacks in a
relatively small time frame which the authors identify
as a matter of minutes. The first 24 bits of a MAC
address represent the OUI prefix allocated to the ven-
dor, with only a small space being allocated and dis-
parity in usage allowing for the search space to be re-
duced. The authors compare the hashing approaches
used by 15 vendors and find whilst the majority use
simple hash based approaches, in two instances ran-
dom ”salt” values are added prior to hashing. The
authors propose a hash-chain approach whereby the
next security key is derived from a hash of the previ-
ous key, when the previous entry is discarded it is not
possible to identify the key. Unfortunately, this solu-
tion still causes there to be a key in the system, rely-
ing on the fact the key is stored in a more secure form
than the data itself - an improved solution should pro-
vide for anonymization without any such key. Such a
chaining approach also raises problems for storage in
a decentralised environment.
Such salts do not function like salts in password
hashing algorithms, in password hashing algorithms
unique salts are stored alongside the passwords and
in the event of a data breach, it means dictionaries of
passwords need to be computed for every salt value,
i.e. unique to each stored password, instead of be-
ing able to compare pre-computed hashes with every
value in the database (Ertaul et al., 2016). In this con-
text, the salt represents more of a key, some vendors
may use the same ”salt” for all captures over the pe-
riod of a day, allowing previous records to be found
for comparison over that time period. If the ”salt” is
disclosed, all records can be de-anonymized over the
period of time that key is used. (Demir et al., 2014)
concludes by proposing an improved trade-off be-
tween searching historical records and securing data,
by using an iterative key derived through insertions
as the salt of the hash function. Unfortunately this
still poses a number of challenges; whilst it provides
greater security of a storage system, the key can still
be obtained if the server computing the statistics is
compromised. Furthermore, the chained approach in-
troduces a search difficulty of O(n) whereas databases
can be optimised using tree structures with B-trees al-
lowing search in O(logn) time.
(Fuxjaeger et al., 2016) notes hashing algorithms
are also unsuitable: ”the claims concerning non-
reversibility have already been shown to be mislead-
ing since the actually allocated part of the 48bit MAC
address space can be reverse-mapped in a brute-force
way with low computing power.” The authors pro-
pose that the MAC address is truncated to provide
anonymity by removing the OUI (the manufacturer
prefix) prior to hashing. Unfortunately, this approach
does not appear to be a suitable anonymization ap-
proach; as (Demir et al., 2014) notes, only 0.1%
of prefixes are allocated (when excluded brute force
space can be reduced 1024x) and the OUIs are not
uniformly distributed with some manufacturer used
dramatically more than others. The experimental re-
sults in (Fuxjaeger et al., 2016) by failing to find any
collisions in their dataset using this model.
(Demir et al., 2017) notes that limits exists to sim-
ple implementations of hashing algorithms in a vari-
ety of applications and consider the use-case of one-
to-many anonymization of MAC addresses. (Marx
et al., 2018) notes that pre-image space is bounded
for a lot of personally identifiable information types,
in the case of MAC addresses by the first 24 bits be-
ing the OUI, reducing the search space to 4.1 · 1011.
With the ability to calculate 6 Giga MD5 hashes and
844 Mega SHA-256 hashes per second the authors are
able to recover 100% of 1 million hashes in 4 min-
utes 1 second for MD5 and 13 minutes 22 seconds for
SHA-256 respectively. This work demonstrates that
even when searching the entire OUI space, it is not
sufficient to use relatively computationally inexpen-
sive hashing functions as adversaries will have signif-
icant capacity.
It is worth noting that both Android and Apple
iOS operating systems allow for devices in a disas-
sociated state to randomise the MAC addresses used
for active scans, allowing for a degree of anonymity
until they connect to an access point. However, the
results of a wide-scale study (Martin et al., 2017), in-
dicate that adoption rates of such technology are sur-
prisingly low and re-identification attacks can be used
in 96% of Android phones. The growth in Bluetooth
hands-free equipment and headphones can further re-
duce the effectiveness of anonymization technology
as the device will be in a paired state. In road traf-
fic situations, the presence of Bluetooth hands-free
devices, GPS devices and Bluetooth systems inbuilt
into vehicle provides for other devices to be used for
tracking purposes, even where mobile phones provide
a degree of anonymization.
Recently, a number of advancements have ap-
peared in the realm of identification of breached pass-
words in an anonymized way. (Li et al., 2019) pro-
OUI ID
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Figure 1: Structure of a MAC Address
vides an overview of protocols for compromised cre-
dential checking (C3) services and a mechanism for
empirically evaluating such protocols. Such protocols
are based off the HIBP protocol whereby passwords
are bucketed based on a hash prefix, allowing for k-
anonymous verification of a breached password as im-
plemented in (Ali, 2017). This bucket is then served
to the user to identify if the password is breached
or not. Other protocols utilising two-way guessing
games are also described, however do require addi-
tional two-way steps in the protocol to achieve such
communication. The optimal approach presented is
known as IDB (identifier based bucketization) where
the prefix of the bucket used is based on a different
identifier, like the hash of a username. The authors
provide formalisation of such C3 protocols, discus-
sion on threat models and empirical analysis of such
protocols. (Thomas et al., 2019) adds additional lay-
ers to such an approach, using computationally ex-
pensive hashing and private set intersection alongside
k-anonymity.
3 Threat Model
The MAC address is a unique identifier for Wi-
Fi, Ethernet and Bluetooth devices and is defined by
IEEE 802 standard. The 24 most significant bits of a
MAC address form an Organizationally Unique Iden-
tifier (OUI) prefix which is registered with the IEEE.
The remaining 24 bits represent the Network Interface
Controller ID, which uniquely identifies a particular
device within the OUI prefix, as shown in Figure 1.
The MAC address search space can crudely be
considered to be 48 bits corresponding to 248 combi-
nations. However as (Demir et al., 2014) notes, given
only 0.1% of OUI prefixes are allocated, the effec-
tive search space is reduced to 224 × (224 × 0.001)
combinations, which can be expressed in at most⌈
log2224× (224×0.001)
⌉
= 39 bits.
Furthermore, guesswork approaches allow for ei-
ther prioritisation or limiting the search space further
based on the most popular hardware manufacturers.
(Demir et al., 2014) found in an experimental dataset
that 50% coverage was obtained with 87 OUI pre-
fixes, 90% coverage with 361 prefixes and 709 pre-
fixes covering 99%. We can accordingly calculate that
50% coverage can be represented in
⌈
log2224×87
⌉
=
31 bits, 90% coverage in 33 bits and 99% coverage in
34 bits respectively.
This demonstrates that due to the limited en-
tropy provided by the OUI prefix of a MAC address,
anonymity is not possible for all records where a
MAC address is hashed with a digest size of 39 bits or
more. Experimental data from (Demir et al., 2014) ac-
cordingly demonstrates that frequency-based attacks
become possible on 50% or more of the dataset when
the hash is truncated to 31 bits or more.
This attack can also be inverted, due to the small
search space when the OUI is removed as the de-
scribed in (Fuxjaeger et al., 2016). Instead of seek-
ing to identify an individual MAC address from a set,
it also allows for data to extract devices of a spe-
cific type. This approach may be combined with the
work in (Martin et al., 2016) where contiguous ad-
dress blocks being allocated to specific devices allows
for fine-grained mapping of the devices in use - al-
lowing the device type to be identified. This reaches
to the fundamental dogma of anonymization of MAC
address information; attacks may be be deductive in
nature, where seek to identify the existence of a MAC
address from a given dataset or inductive, which seek
to extract enriched data from the dataset, such as in
(Martin et al., 2016). We therefore must consider
these two threats in our anonymity model.
4 Anonymity Model
4.1 Choice of Hashing Algorithm
It is essential to ensure that when MAC addresses are
placed to anonymized buckets, they are unrelated to
other records contained into those buckets. Whilst
(Fuxjaeger et al., 2016) proposes simply removing the
OUI manufacturer prefix from MAC address before
storage thus reducing the search space to 24 bits, such
an approach is still vulnerable to individuation attacks
given (Martin et al., 2016) finds that contiguous ad-
dress blocks are allocated to specific devices meaning
the residual NIC suffix of the MAC address can sim-
ilarly be used for identification attacks and as (Demir
et al., 2014) notes that as only 0.1% of OUI prefixes
are allocated.
Fortunately, hash functions counter this issue. The
Avalanche effect means a small change in the input re-
sults in a completely different output (Ali, 2017), this
has the effect of distributing devices with the same
OUI prefix throughout the dataset of resulting hashes
(and contiguous NIC blocks).
(Marx et al., 2018) notes that due to the small
pre-image space of MAC addresses, it is possible
to brute force such values in a matter of minutes
when using the SHA256 algorithm. To compli-
ment our anonymity approach and deter mapping of
anonymized hashes with possible values, we elect
to use computationally expensive hashing functions
to increase the computational complexity required
for brute force attacks, as used with passwords in
(Thomas et al., 2019).
Key derivation functions like Argon2, PBKDF2,
BCrypt or SCrypt may be used with a configurable
work factor and a salt input. Such that the result-
ing digests can be used for simple comparisons of
the resulting digest, we propose that the salt is used
as a static value which acts as a secret; (Alimpia
et al., 2018) provides more information on how such
a configuration can be used with BCrypt in Expen-
sive Key Setup to generate Message Authentication
Codes. Such a salt can be rotated as desired, (Demir
et al., 2014) provides an overview of upper-bound re-
tention time by some manufacturers which may be
relevant to determining key rotation policies. By us-
ing a computationally expensive key derivation func-
tion instead of a more simplistic hash, data is pro-
tected by means of both a secret and (in the event
the key is compromised) exhaustive search becomes
more difficult dependant on a work factor. Deploy-
ments where a user identifier is available (such as a
registration plate number or an email address) provide
for additional entropy to be added into the salt value
where applicable.
As noted in (Cragg, 2013), it is critical that hash-
ing is performed at the time of detection prior to the
MAC Address being recorded. This approach means
that there is no post-processing work required to form
a hashed identifier for the MAC Addresses as the re-
sulting digest is consistent. This provides the addi-
tional benefit that the work function can be set to a
high value to deter brute force attacks without the
need to compute hashes in bulk for post collection
analysis, as required by (Demir et al., 2014).
The maximum work factor of a hash function is
limited by the resources available compute the hash
and the traffic rate. (?) describes that it is increas-
ingly trivial for an attacker to gain vast amounts of
computational resources for cracking hashes and ac-
cordingly recommends use of memory hard functions
(MHFs) such as SCrypt or Argon2 to reduce the dam-
age of offline attacks (in contrast to non-memory hard
functions such as BCrypt or PBKDF2). The Argon2
hash algorithm won the Password Hashing Compe-
tition (PHC) run from 2013 to 2015 (?) and is de-
scribed in (?). Argon2 exists in two variants, Argon2i
(optimised for resisting side-channel attacks) and Ar-
gon2d (instead optimised for resisting GPU acceler-
ated cracking attacks). Whilst side-channel attacks
are a risk for authentication systems, such threats do
not exist ordinarily for journey time monitoring sys-
tems with no user interaction. Given the limited en-
tropy of MAC Addresses poses a vastly greater risk,
we accordingly select the Argon2d algorithm.
4.2 Bucketization of Hashes
We seek to devise an approach whereby hashes are
placed into anonymous buckets, with an acceptable
upper bound on acceptable collision rate. Whilst there
is a low probability a MAC address is unique in a
given segment of a dataset, over a larger timescale or
greater geographic area there is ambiguity as to the
identity of the user as the probability of collision in-
creases.
(Demir et al., 2017) provides a detailed explana-
tion of the Birthday Paradox and notes an approxima-
tion to identify how many m messages are approxi-
mately required for there to be at least 1 collision with
p probability given n possible digests, this is shown
in Eq. (1). This indicates that with a digest of 30
bits (one less than the 31 bits needed to represent the
87 OUIs that provided 50% coverage in (Demir et al.,
2014)), an approximate 5% probability of at least one
collision is obtained after just 10,495 unique MAC
addresses and a 50% probability after 38,581 unique
MAC addresses.
m≈
√
2n× ln( 1
1− p ) (1)
We reformulate this approximation to provide the
number of n possible digests for a given number of
messages m and the probability p that one digest cor-
responds to 2 or more input values as shown in Eq (2).
The number of bits required to store n digest combi-
nations can be found as bits≥ dlog2ne.
n≈ m
2
2
× 1
ln( 11−p )
(2)
For convenience, a set of pre-computed approx-
imations can be found in Table 1. The approxima-
tion demonstrates that 1000 inputs with an acceptable
probability of at least one collision being 0.05 can be
represented in 24 bits and 21 bits where the maximum
acceptable probability of at least one collision is 0.25.
It is worth noting that in instances where m >
1,312 and the desired probability remains 5%, the
number of bits required can exceed the 24 bit size
of the NIC suffix of the MAC address, which can be
more problematic in situations where a small group of
manufacturers produce devices in the sample set. It is
also worth noting that digest sizes of 24 bits or less
still appear to be suitable when the maximum desired
probability is 25% where m ≤ 3,106 and m ≤ 4,822
where the probability is raised to 50%.
Table 1: Approximate number of bits required in the output
of a hash function for≤ p probability of there being at least
1 collision with m inputs.
p/ 0.05 p/ 0.25 p/ 0.5 p/ 0.75
m≈ 100 17 bits 15 bits 13 bits 12 bits
m≈ 1,000 24 bits 21 bits 20 bits 19 bits
m≈ 10,000 30 bits 28 bits 27 bits 26 bits
m≈ 100,000 37 bits 35 bits 33 bits 32 bits
m≈ 1,000,000 44 bits 41 bits 40 bits 39 bits
It is critical to note the approximation approach
described in Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) simply calculate the
probability of there being at least 1 collision but do
not estimate the rate of collisions.
A more crudely modified Birthday Paradox ap-
proximation was applied for calculating a digest size
for one-to-many hash based anonymization in MAC
addresses in (Demir et al., 2017) where it is also noted
that this can quickly lead to anonymity as the num-
ber of messages increases. (Demir et al., 2017) con-
tend that it is difficult to control the anonymity set
size when using such approximations. As can be seen
in Table 1, this approach rapidly leads to digest sizes
that offer no anonymity. Recall (Minch, 2015) men-
tions a deployment of 12 sensors which, on a single
day on the 6th July, detected 106,629 unique MAC
addresses, which represents approximately 11.3% of
all (non-unique) detections.
We take a different approach and allow for an ac-
ceptable proportion of MAC addresses to experience
collision, instead of trying to minimise the probabil-
ity of at least one collision in the anonymized dataset.
Below we derive an expression for the rate of colli-
sions p for m messages hashed across n digests (or
buckets). The probability that a message collides
with another, i.e. when there is only one other di-
gest stored, can be computed as 1/n. The probability
that no such collision exists is therefore 1− 1/n. To
find the probability that m−1 addresses do not collide
with a given digest, we can compute (1− 1/n)m−1.
Simply subtracting such a result from 1 will therefore
provide the probability that a message will have a col-
lision, given a total of m messages and a digest size of
n:
p = 1− (1−1/n)m−1 (3)
The expected number of collisions within m mes-
sages is thus C = p×m. Eq. (3) provides that with a
24 bit digest (m = 224), the rate p exceeds 0.01 when
m > 168617. Where m ≤ 224, we are able to provide
at least, or better, anonymization as the approach de-
tailed in (Fuxjaeger et al., 2016) of removing the the
OUI manufacturer prefix from MAC address. How-
ever; due to the hashing approach, we similarly are
able to mitigate risks of attacks described in (Martin
et al., 2016) due to the NIC suffix of the MAC address
being allocated on a contiguous basis. A computed ta-
ble of minimum digest sizes required to provide for a
maximum p rate of collision given m MAC addresses
is provided in Table 2.
In the context of MAC addresses, the value of m
should be set appropriate for the detection volume
over a given time period and the value p should be
set to the desired rate of collision. For example, with
10,000 unique detections between two points in a 40
minute interval (250 vehicles per minute) and accept-
able collision rate of 1%, a hash digest of 20 bits may
be suitable. However, with 360,000 unique detections
over a 24 hour period, assuming a consistent detection
rate of unique MAC addresses, the collision rate rises
to 29.1%.
Note that the volume of MAC addresses collected
may also vary by sampling rate. A study in Delaware
(Sharifi et al., 2011) found the detection rate for Blue-
tooth traffic sensors to vary by hour from a minimum
of 4.3% to a maximum of 6.9%. This corresponded
to a sampling rate (for a journey time calculation) be-
tween 2.02% and 5.39%.
Table 2: Minimum number of bits required in the output of
a hash function for ≤ p rate of collisions in the dataset with
m inputs.
p≤ 0.01 p≤ 0.05 p≤ 0.5 p≤ 0.75
m = 100 14 bits 9 bits 8 bits 7 bits
m = 1,000 17 bits 15 bits 11 bits 10 bits
m = 10,000 20 bits 18 bits 14 bits 13 bits
m = 100,000 24 bits 21 bits 33 bits 18 bits
m = 1,000,000 27 bits 25 bits 21 bits 20 bits
5 Evaluation
5.1 Experiment setup
The goal of evaluation is to validate the expression for
collision rate using realistic MAC addresses as well as
obtain hash configurations where the rate of collision
remains less than or equal to 1% at intervals of 100,
1,000 and 10,000 unique MAC addresses. We for-
mulate an experiment to gain empirical metrics on the
rate of collision for given number of MAC addresses
and a given digest size. Such hashes are anonymized
in the manner aforesaid in the previous section; the
MAC address is concatenated with a randomly gener-
ated salt, a hash is computed and truncated to obtain
anonymity.
We randomly generate m unique MAC addresses
in 00:16:3e:00:00:00 and 00:16:3e:7f:ff:ff range (≈
8.4 × 106 possible values), using a script recom-
mended by RedHat for generating randomised MAC
addresses for virtual machines (Red Hat, Inc., 2020).
Such MAC addresses are then hashed together with
a randomly-generated static 68-bit salt. The hash is
then truncated to log2n bits, where n is the maximum
number of digests that can be stored in a given hash.
As a MAC address is hashed, in the event the trun-
cated digest collides with a previous value, the num-
ber of collisions is incremented. A rate of collisions is
calculated as the number of collisions divided by m.
This experiment is repeated 100 times on each
quantity of MAC addresses, for each digest size. On
each round a new set of random MAC addresses is de-
vised and a new random salt generated. The median
value is recorded once all the rounds are completed.
The experiment was run on digest sizes from 213 to
221 and quantities of MAC addresses from m = 100 to
m = 100,000. Due to the high amount of hashes that
needed to be computed for this experiment, it was run
overnight on a cloud computing environment.
5.2 Results and Discussion
Table 3 shows the results of these experiments.
The experiment demonstrates that for 100 MAC ad-
dresses, a digest size of 13 bits yields 1% collisions
but rises to 11.1% in a dataset of 1,000 hashes, 62.6%
in a dataset of 10,000 hashes and 95.9% in a dataset
of 100,000 hashes. Similarly, a digest size of 217 is
suitable for acceptable 0.7% collisions in a dataset of
10,000 hashes but increases to 7.1% in 10,000 ad-
dresses and 48.7% in 100,000 addresses.
The experimental results closely match the ap-
proximation given by an analytical approximation.
For datasets of 1,000 and 10,000 MAC addresses
both the probabilistic calculation and the experimen-
tal results show digest sizes of 17 bits and 20 yield
less than 1% collisions. For datasets of 100 MAC
addresses, whilst the probabilistic calculation showed
13 bits would yield a 1.2% rate of collisions, we ex-
perimentally found that 13 bits delivered the accept-
able 1% rate of collision. As the dataset was only
formed of 100 MAC Addresses, the collision rate in-
crements by 1% for each collision. As a comparison,
Eq (3) indicates that for 100 MAC addresses and a di-
gest size of 214, the rate of collision should be 0.6%.
For 1,000 MAC addresses, a digest size of 217 should
yield a rate of collisions of 0.8%. Finally, for 10,000
MAC addresses, a digest size of 220 results in a rate
of 1.0%.
We accordingly demonstrate that the obtained ex-
pression is practically suitable for determining the
probability of collision in a dataset of hashes, given
the size of a hash digest and the number of records
stored. The increase in the number of records
yields a higher rate of collisions, demonstrating the
anonymization effect.
Table 3: Median % of collisions (rounded to 1 decimal
place) for m MAC addresses hashed into n buckets.
m = 100 m = 1,000 m = 10,000 m = 100,000
n = 213 1.0% 11.1% 62.6% 95.9%
n = 214 0.0% 5.7% 42.2% 91.8%
n = 215 0.0% 3.0% 25.2% 83.7%
n = 216 0.0% 1.4% 13.8% 68.7%
n = 217 0.0% 0.7% 7.1% 48.7%
n = 218 0.0% 0.4% 3.7% 30.0%
n = 219 0.0% 0.2% 1.9% 16.9%
n = 220 0.0% 0.1% 1.0% 9.0%
n = 221 0.0% 0.0% 0.5% 4.6%
6 Conclusion and Future work
In this paper we study MAC address anonymiza-
tion strategies for Bluetooth and Wi-Fi based track-
ing systems. Existing approaches to anonymization
using hash-based approaches have been found to be
easily invertible due to a small search space and lim-
ited number of well-known OUI manufacturer pre-
fixes which makes frequency-based attacks possible.
Whilst MAC addresses are 48 bits in length, we find
that the entire allocated space of MAC addresses can
be represented in no more than 39 bits and 50% of
the most common manufacturers can be represented
in just 31 bits.
Contrary to prior work on anonymization of hash-
based datasets that sought to minimise the probability
of ”at least one” collision, we have instead formulated
the problem in terms of defining a tolerable rate of
collisions in the overall dataset. We present a practical
approach to anonymizing MAC addresses by hash-
ing MAC addresses using computationally expensive
algorithms and truncating the digests to achieve k-
anonymity. We provide an approach for calculating
the rate of collisions in a dataset and experimentally
demonstrate this approach in practice, showing it to
be suitable to obtain hash configurations with an ac-
ceptable rate of collisions below 1% (for example,
using a digest size of 20 bits for 10,000 MAC ad-
dresses).
The proposed approach opens the door for hash-
based anonymization to be applied to low-entropy
datasets, which is a potential further work. Other ar-
eas for potential investigation include an investigation
of privacy-preserving opt-out mechanisms. Our work
also opens the door for novel approaches in anony-
mous contact tracing during disease pandemics with-
out the need to deploy new software to user devices.
Further research on de-anonymization attacks of the
approach we have outlined would be of interest, par-
ticularly amongst practical datasets. Finally, multi-
dimensional de-anonymization attacks would prove to
be interesting, where such trackers capture additional
information such as walking or cycling speed, or de-
vice characteristics.
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